We present a physical layer assisted message authentication scheme that uses Angle of Arrival (AoA) estimation to verify the message originator location based on the claimed location information. The problem of deciding whether the received signal is originated from the claimed GPS location is formulated as a two sided hypotheses testing problem whose solution is given by Wald test statics. Moreover, we give the correct decision and false alarm probabilities in a closed form as a quantitative performance measure. We Also introduce a physical layer assisted secret key agreement (PHY-SKA) protocol in which peer vehicles are required to validate their respective physical location.
I. INTRODUCTION
We present a physical layer assisted message authentication scheme that makes use of the information contained in beacon messages to validate the claimed GPS location information with the AoA information obtained at the physical layer. The proposed scheme provides a solution for message authentication problem in VANETs against an attacker with single or multiple stolen certificates that intentionally falsies different GPS locations or an attacker that spoofs/jams GPS information [1] of legitimate nodes. We formulate the problem of position verification as a two sided hypotheses testing problem whose solution is given by Wald test statics [2] . Also in this paper, we extend the potential of physical layer contribution in security to provide a physical layer assisted secret key agreement (PHY-SKA) protocol. A public key (PK) based SKA in which communicating vehicles are required to validate their respective physical location. Fig. (1) , we consider the scenario in which a VANET consists of multiple vehicles. Beacon messages are exchanged periodically to collect neighboring vehicles GPS locations, time and speed information. An attacker with a stolen certificate falsifies its location information aiming to mislead the target vehicles to accept its message. For simplicity, we assume all communication nodes to be equipped with multiple antenna transceivers each of array size (n > 1). The discrete baseband equivalent channel of the received signal can be expressed as:
II. SYSTEM MODEL As illustrated in
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n p , 1 ≤ j ≤ n s and 1 ≤ k ≤ 64 denotes the packet number, symbol index and subcarrier index respectively, 
We model H as a Rician fading channel. Thus, we consider the following channel decomposition:
where H los and H nlos represents the LOS and NLOS (diffuse) components respectively and
where k is the Ricean factor, Ψ = a(θ)a † (φ), a(θ) and a(φ) are the antenna array response vectors at receiver and transmitter respectively, θ and φ are the AoA and Angle of departure (AoD) of the transmitted signal.Ĥ ∼ CN (0, I n×n ) represents the channel coefficients matrix for the NLOS signal component. Based on the given signal model, the ML-AoA estimator can be found as [3] :
where
and R z is the noise plus diffuse component covariance matrix. Furthermore, note that the regularity conditions required for the normality of the ML-AoA estimator [4] can easily be shown to hold for the likelihood function of the considered model. Thus, in the limit of large sample, the ML-AoA estimator converges in distribution to a random variable with a truncated normal distribution which can be expressed as follows:
III. PHY ASSISTED MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION
In the proposed scheme,each vehicle/RSU builds up a table containing the expected, θ b , as well as the estimated,θ, AoAs for each of the other neighboring vehicles/RSUs as illustrated in Table (I). Based on the collected data, the problem of deciding whether the received signal is originated from the declared physical direction can be formulated as a two sided hypotheses testing problem whose solution is obtained as Wald test statistics:
where,θ is the ML-AoA estimator given in Eq. (4) and α is the decision threshold. Recalling the distribution of the ML-AoA estimator given in Eq. (5), we define both the probability of detection an probability of false alarm as follows:
IV. SECRET KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL
In this section we give the algorithm for the PHY-SKA between vehicles A and B without trusted third party interaction. The steps for the proposed SKA procedures are as follows:
1) A select one of its preloaded public/private key pairs together with their corresponding certificate. 2) A sends a message including its PK asking for B's PK. 3) B accepts the message if it both pass the conventional PKI authentication and the AoA estimate,θa, is consistent, otherwise, abort. 4) B sends a message including its PK together with an m bits quantized version of the estimateθa encrypted with A's public key. 5) A accepts the message if it both pass the conventional PKI authentication and the AoA estimate,θ b , is consistent, otherwise, abort. 6) B sends a message including secret session key, K, together with an m bits quantized version of the estimateθ b encrypted with B's public key. 7) B accepts the message if it both pass the conventional PKI authentication and the AoA estimate,θa, is consistent, otherwise, abort. 8) Both A and B employs an arbitrary function g(K,θa,θ b ) to generate the physically validated session key K .
V. SIMULATION RESULTS We evaluate the proposed physical layer assisted message authentication in terms of the probability of detection, P D , and the false alarm probability, P F as a function of signal to noise ratio SN R for decision threshold α ranges from 1 • to 5 • an Ricean factor k = 10 and k = 100. While both P D and P F are functions of the legitimate and attacker locations respectively, we shall give two different scenarios: 1) To evaluate P D , legitimate vehicle located at 25 • is considered. As shown in Fig. (2.(a) ), P D approaches 1 as SN R and α increase, meanwhile, the same result holds true for increasing the Ricean factor from k = 10 to k = 100 of course with P D approaches 1 faster as shown in Fig. (2.(b) ). 2) To evaluate P F , we first consider attacker vehicle located at 40 • while it claims that it is located at 37.5 • . As shown in Fig. (3.(a) ), P F approaches 0 faster for smaller values of α as SN R increase, meanwhile, the same result holds true for increasing the Ricean factor from k = 10 to k = 100 of course with P F approaches 0 faster as shown in Fig. (3.(b) ). 
